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193 
THE USE OF MERGER ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES 
TO ASSESS THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF 
REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reverse payment settlements, in which a brand drug manufacturer 
makes a payment to a generic drug manufacturer in exchange for the 
generic manufacturer delaying entry into the market, are a frequent topic 
of scholarship. Common debates range from favoring either antitrust
1
 or 
patent
2
 laws to analyzing which settlements are most likely to be harmful 
to competition.
3
 The Supreme Court partially resolved these issues in FTC 
v. Actavis, Inc.
4
 when it held that lower courts analyzing reverse payment 
settlements should apply the “rule of reason” in weighing the 
anticompetitive concerns of the settlement against any procompetitive 
justifications.
5
 In doing so, the Court left to lower courts the task of 
structuring the particular rule of reason analyses.
6
  
This Note offers a solution for lower courts conducting the rule of 
reason analysis: consider a reverse payment settlement the functional 
equivalent of a merger and apply the techniques and case law associated 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for 
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37 (2009). 
 2. See, e.g., Tania Khatibifar, Note, The Need for a Patent-Centric Standard of Antitrust Review 
to Evaluate Reverse Payment Settlements, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1351 
(2013). 
 3. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements 
in Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303 (2010). 
 4. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 5. Id. at 2237. The rule of reason “is not really so much a set standard of behavior as it is a 
general inquiry into whether, under ‘all the circumstances,’ the challenged practice ‘impos[es] an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.’” WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, 
ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 2:10 (2013) (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 49 (1977)). In Actavis, the FTC urged the Court to adopt the “quick look” approach to reverse 
payment settlements, but the Court declined to apply this analysis. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. Courts 
sometime adopt a quick look analysis where  
the defendant’s conduct is shown to be of a type that . . . appears so likely to have 
anticompetitive effects . . . that it becomes unnecessary to go through a full-blown analysis of 
market definition, market power, and anticompetitive effect before shifting the burden onto 
the defendant to come forward with a plausible, procompetitive justification for its behavior. 
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra, § 2:10. In Actavis, the Court held that the quick look approach “is 
appropriate only where ‘an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
markets,’” and that reverse payment settlements do no present such a situation. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 
2237 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)).  
 6. Actavis, 113 S. Ct. at 2238. 
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with Section 7
7
 merger cases. As will be explored below, lower courts 
have attempted many forms of analysis, many of which were rejected in 
Actavis.
8
 Because mergers frequently raise the same anticompetitive 
concerns as reverse payment settlements, the analyses take place in a 
common structure, which allows the imputation of merger case law to 
settlement analysis. Merger analysis is also sufficiently flexible such that 
only the truly anticompetitive settlements will be prevented. By providing 
a common framework for assessing reverse payment settlements, merger 
analysis allows for consistent holdings across the federal circuits—a 
consistency severely lacking in pre-Actavis case law. 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II examines the history of reverse 
payment settlements and highlights the need for a consistent analysis 
structure. Part III compares the anticompetitive concerns of reverse 
payment settlements and mergers to argue that applying merger analysis is 
appropriate. Part IV surveys the available tools and relevant case law of 
merger analysis. Finally, Part V applies these tools to reverse payment 
settlements. 
II. THE HISTORY OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Reverse payment settlements sit at the intersection of patent law and 
antitrust law. The unique regulatory framework governing the 
pharmaceutical industry creates a system that encourages these 
settlements, but federal courts have disagreed over their legality. Although 
presented with an opportunity to resolve the disagreement, the Supreme 
Court merely noted the incorrect approaches and left it to the trial courts to 
establish the proper structure of the analysis.
9
 To fully explore the analyses 
available after Actavis, it is necessary to first review the major legislation 
governing the introduction of generic pharmaceuticals and the legal tests 
historically applied to reverse payment settlements.  
 
 
 7. Section 7 of the Clayton Act states that “[n]o person engaged in commerce . . . shall acquire 
. . . the stock . . . of another person engaged also in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, 
where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create 
a monopoly.” Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 8. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 9. Id. at 2237–38 (“[T]he FTC must prove its case as in other rule-of-reason cases. . . . We 
therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/9
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A. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
The regulatory framework established by the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to engage in a 
thorough approval process that includes several rounds of clinical 
testing.
10
 The process is both costly and lengthy.
11
 In fact, the original 
approval process often took so long that a considerable portion of the 
patent term expired before the drug even reached the market.
12
 Patent 
laws, however, barred generic manufacturers from beginning the FDA 
approval process for a generic version of a patented drug while the brand-
name patent was still in effect.
13
 The lengthy approval process for a 
generic drug therefore effectively extended the length of the brand 
manufacturer’s patent.14 In short, the original process was cumbersome 
and harmful to both brand and generic manufacturers. 
Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, in part to alleviate 
barriers to generic entry into the market.
15
 The Act has two relevant 
effects. First, conduct by generic manufacturers that would ordinarily be 
considered patent infringement is exempt from patent liability.
16
 Second, a 
generic manufacturer can “piggyback” off a brand manufacturer’s New 
Drug Application (NDA) data and obtain FDA approval simply by filing 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) and showing that the 
generic drug is “bioequivalent” to the patented brand drug.17 By allowing 
generic manufacturers to rely on the brand manufacturer’s data 
demonstrating the safety and efficacy of the drug, the Act makes market 
entry much cheaper and thus has ultimately made generic entry much 
more feasible.
18
   
 
 
 10. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012). 
 11. See generally Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). 
 12. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 4 (2002), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-
expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6DEU-SW72 [hereinafter 
FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY]. 
 13. Beginning the approval process earlier “would typically have infringed the brand-name 
company’s patents.” Id.; see also Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
 14. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 12, at 4. 
 15. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012). 
 16. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 12, at 4. 
 17. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv); see also FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 12, at 4–7. 
 18. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 617–18 (2011) (estimating the cost of preparing and filing an ANDA 
to be $1 million). 
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The Act requires that an ANDA contain a “certification” for each 
relevant patent held by the brand drug manufacturer that would affect the 
generic drug.
19
 Under a “Paragraph IV” certification, the ANDA alleges 
that the brand manufacturer’s “patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic drug.20 ANDA applicants 
have strong incentives to claim a Paragraph IV certification. First, an 
ANDA applicant is “protected from infringement liability so long as it has 
not begun marketing the drug.”21 The generic manufacturer thus faces little 
risk in filing a Paragraph IV certification.
22
 Second, the first successful 
filer of a Paragraph IV certification for the generic version of a particular 
drug is granted a 180-day exclusive distribution period for the generic 
drug if the ANDA is ultimately successful.
23
 Paragraph IV certifications, 
therefore, are very appealing to generic manufacturers. 
If a generic manufacturer successfully challenges a brand 
manufacturer’s patent by showing that either the patent is invalid or the 
generic drug does not infringe upon the patent holder’s rights,24 the 
generic manufacturer essentially creates, at a minimum, a duopoly with the 
brand manufacturer.
25
 The addition of a competitor encourages lower 
 
 
 19. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 12, at 5–6 (“The statute provides ANDA applicants 
with four certification options: they may certify (I) that the required patent information has not been 
filed; (II) that the patent has expired; (III) that the patent has not expired, but will expire on a particular 
date and approval is sought after patent expiration; or (IV) that the patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the generic drug for which the ANDA applicant seeks approval.”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(2)(A)(vii).  
 20. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012). 
 21. Shannon U. Han, Note Pay-to-Delay Settlements: The Circuit-Splitting Headache Plaguing 
Big Pharma, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 913, 920 (2013). 
 22. In fact, the patent holder faces a greater risk when pursuing an infringement claim. If the 
claim is successful, it is likely to result in zero damages because the generic drug is not yet being 
produced. Conversely, if the claim is not successful, the patent holder has substantially weakened the 
credibility of its patent. See Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 270–71 (2012). 
 23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(IV)(iv)(I). 
 24. For example, a patent may have been improperly granted to a brand drug that is obvious in 
light of prior art, so the patent is invalid. Alternatively, construction of the claims included in a valid 
patent may limit the patent such that generic production does not constitute infringement. See, e.g., In 
re OxyContin Antitrust Litig., 994 F. Supp. 2d 367, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“With respect to every 
patent-in-suit, either (1) [defendant’s] ANDA does not occupy the technological space where plaintiffs 
enjoy the right to exclude others or (2) plaintiffs’ right to exclude others is based on an invalid 
patent.”). 
 25. Generic drugs generally do “not enter the market until there was a district court holding that 
the brand-name company’s patent was invalid or not-infringed.” FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra 
note 12, at 22. After generic entry, the duopoly exists for the life of the 180-day exclusive distribution 
period that results from a Paragraph IV filing. After the expiration of this period, the duopoly can grow 
to a competitive market as more generic manufacturers enter the market. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW 
DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 3 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/9
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market prices for consumers.
26
 As a result, Paragraph IV certifications 
provide brand drug manufacturers with strong incentives to settle with 
generic manufacturers rather than litigate and risk potential patent 
invalidity.  
These settlements, known as reverse payment settlements, typically 
involve payments from the brand manufacturer to the generic 
manufacturer in exchange for the generic manufacturer agreeing to refrain 
from “purchasing, manufacturing, using, selling, distributing, and shipping 
to third parties any form of the generic’s drug product until the expiration 
of the patents.”27 The settlement allows the brand manufacturer to preserve 
the effect of its patent without the risk of litigation.
28
 The ultimate effect of 
such a settlement, however, is that the brand manufacturer continues to 
charge supracompetitive prices for its product and consumers do not 
receive the benefit of generic entry.
29
 
B. Differing Legal Standards 
Though a patent grants the brand drug manufacturer a certain amount 
of monopoly power over the production and sale of the patented drug, the 
field of antitrust law has developed to prevent monopoly power from 
being used to harm competition and consumers.
30
 In the context of reverse 
payment settlements, the antitrust issue arises when the brand 
manufacturer preserves its monopoly through a large cash payment to a 
potential competitor.
31
 It is this payment, not the settlement itself, that 
 
 
sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-
federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.  
 26. With the addition of the generic drug into the market, either the manufacturers compete on 
price, or the brand maintains its price and cedes market to the lower-priced generic. Either scenario 
results in the reallocation of “billions of dollars from producers to consumers.” C. Scott Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1553, 1557 (2006). 
 27. FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 12, at 31. 
 28. Under the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act, “[t]he 180-day exclusivity period commences 
either on the date the [first-filing] generic first begins commercial marketing or on the date a court 
decides that the patent is in fact invalid or not infringed.” Morris, supra note 22, at 264. By settling 
with the first-filer, the first-filer’s drug is never marketed and a court never rules on the validity of the 
patent, meaning the 180-day exclusivity period never begins. Because the exclusivity period never 
beings, generic manufacturers other than the first-filer do not have the opportunity to enter the market 
until after the patent expires. 
 29. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1557. 
 30. See id. at 1555–56. 
 31. “The effect of such pay-for-delay agreements is to remove the possibility of early 
competition in the drug, and to deny consumers the allocative benefit of low prices, which would have 
followed with some probability had the litigation proceeded to conclusion.” Id. at 1557. 
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draws scrutiny and renders the transaction potentially anticompetitive.
32
 
Several circuits have considered the issue and reached vastly different 
conclusions. 
1. Per Se Illegality 
The Sixth Circuit held in 2003 that reverse payment settlements are 
unreasonable restraints of trade and are thus per se illegal.
33
 The court 
emphasized that the brand manufacturer effectively eliminated its only 
potential competitor through the settlement, explaining, “[I]t is one thing 
to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but 
another thing altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting 
competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40 million per year 
to stay out of the market.”34 The court found no justification for the 
settlement other than keeping the generic drug out of the market, and thus 
found the per se rule appropriate.
35
 
2. Scope of the Patent Test 
The Second Circuit declined to apply the per se rule.
36
 The court 
reasoned that reverse payment settlements should not be considered per se 
illegal because “reverse payments are particularly to be expected in the 
drug-patent context because the Hatch–Waxman Act created an 
environment that encourages them.”37 Instead, the court adopted the 
“scope of the patent” test.38 Under this test, “[w]hatever damage is done to 
competition by settlement is done pursuant to the monopoly extended to 
the patent holder by patent law unless the terms of the settlement enlarge 
the scope of that monopoly.”39 The Second Circuit further held that “until 
 
 
 32. Han, supra note 21, at 915. 
 33. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 34. Id. (citations omitted). 
 35. The Sixth Circuit further opined on the per se rule, noting that “the virtue/vice of the per 
se rule is that it allows courts to presume that certain behaviors as a class are anticompetitive without 
expending judicial resources to evaluate the actual anticompetitive effects or procompetitive 
justifications in a particular case.” Id. at 909. 
 36. In rejecting the per se rule, the Second Circuit differentiated the matter from the Sixth Circuit 
case by explaining that “the Settlement Agreement did not extend the patent monopoly by restraining 
the introduction or marketing of unrelated or non-infringing products.” In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013). 
 37. Id. at 206 (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 
252 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). 
 38. Id. at 213. 
 39. Id. at 212–13. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/9
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the patent is shown to have been procured by fraud, or a suit for its 
enforcement is shown to be objectively baseless, there is no injury to the 
market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as competition is 
restrained only within the scope of the patent.”40 
In the case that the Supreme Court later heard as FTC v. Actavis, the 
Eleventh Circuit echoed the Second Circuit’s scope of the patent reasoning 
in 2012.
41
 The court explained that “absent sham litigation or fraud in 
obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from 
antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope 
of the exclusionary potential of the patent.”42 The Eleventh Circuit 
reasoned that the scope of the patent test will not overprotect weak patents 
because  
[i]f the patent actually is vulnerable, then presumably [additional] 
generic companies . . . will attempt to enter the market and make 
their own challenges to the patent. . . . Although a patent holder may 
be able to escape the jaws of competition by sharing monopoly 
profits with the first one or two generic challengers, those profits 
will be eaten away as more and more generic companies enter the 
waters by filing their own paragraph IV certifications attacking the 
patent.
43
 
The opportunistic generic manufacturers, according to the Eleventh 
Circuit, thus ensure that any anticompetitive behavior outside the scope of 
the patent will be punished under the antitrust laws. 
The Federal Circuit has also adopted the scope of the patent test.
44
 The 
court noted that “there is a long-standing policy in the law in favor of 
settlements, and this policy extends to patent infringement litigation.”45 
Further, “[s]ettlement of patent claims by agreement between the parties—
including exchange of consideration—rather than by litigation is not 
precluded by the Sherman Act even though it may have some adverse 
effects on competition.”46  
 
 
 40. Id. at 213 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 
535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).  
 41. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312–15 (11th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. 
FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 42. Id. at 1312. 
 43. Id. at 1315. 
 44. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), 
abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 45. Id. at 1333. 
 46. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 n.5 (1931)). 
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3. Two New Standards For One Settlement  
The settlement that perhaps best illustrated the varying standards 
among the circuits was the K-Dur settlement. Two circuits had the 
opportunity to analyze the same settlement, and not only did they apply 
tests different from the per se test and the scope of the patent test, each 
applied a different form of the rule of reason than the other. Despite 
analyzing the same transaction, the circuits came to different conclusions 
about its legality.  
In 1997 and 1998, K-Dur manufacturer Schering-Plough settled with 
two generic K-Dur manufacturers.
47
 Each settlement’s terms included the 
generic manufacturer delaying entry into the market, and Schering making 
payments to the generic manufacturer.
48
 The FTC filed a complaint against 
Schering in 2001, alleging that the settlements “were illegal agreements in 
restraint of trade” that violated both the Federal Trade Commission Act 
and the Sherman Act.
49
 Initially, the Commission rejected the settlements 
as unreasonable restraints of trade.
50
 The Eleventh Circuit, in turn, rejected 
the Commission’s decision, explaining that patents naturally include 
potentially anticompetitive results.
51
 In fact, the court rejected both per se 
and rule of reason analyses.
52
 Because prior analyses were thus 
inappropriate, the Eleventh Circuit created a new test requiring 
“examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; 
(2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the 
resulting anticompetitive effects.”53 Under this test, the Eleventh Circuit 
found no violation of antitrust law.
54
 
In 2008, the District of New Jersey certified a class of K-Dur 
purchasers who alleged that the K-Dur reverse payment settlements 
constituted unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.
55
 The district court applied the scope of the patent test and, 
 
 
 47. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1058-61 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. at 1061. 
 50. Id. at 1062 (declaring as anticompetitive a settlement “under which the generic receives 
anything of value and agrees to defer its own research, development, production or sales activities”). 
 51. Id. at 1065–66 (“By their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and 
consequently, cripple competition. The anticompetitive effect is already present.”).  
 52. Id. (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 n.27 (11th Cir. 
2003)). 
 53. Id. at 1066. 
 54. Id. at 1076. 
 55. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, judgment 
vacated sub nom. Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 (2013), and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss1/9
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after finding the settlement did not exceed the patent’s scope, granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment.56 On appeal, the Third Circuit 
rejected the scope of the patent test, and held that “any payment from a 
patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into 
the market [is] prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade” 
and the finder of fact should apply a quick look rule of reason analysis.
57
 
The Third Circuit then reversed lower court’s opinion and remanded the 
case for further proceedings.
58
 
C. Actavis and Partial Split Resolution 
After having its K-Dur victory reversed by the Third Circuit’s rule of 
reason approach, Merck
59
 filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court on August 24, 2012.
60
 Three days later, the Eleventh 
Circuit denied the FTC’s petition to rehear a different reverse payment 
settlement case, FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals.
61
 Shortly thereafter, the 
FTC petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the 
Eleventh Circuit’s decision.62 In December 2012, the Supreme Court 
granted the FTC’s petition and agreed to hear the case as FTC v. Actavis.63 
In FTC v. Actavis, Solvay Pharmaceuticals obtained a patent for its 
FDA-approved, brand-name drug AndroGel.
64
 Thereafter, generic 
manufacturers Actavis and Paddock each filed an ANDA that included a 
Paragraph IV certification claiming both that Solvay’s patent was invalid 
and, even if it was valid, their drugs did not infringe upon the patent.
65
 
Pursuant to the procedure established by the Hatch-Waxman Act, Solvay 
initiated Paragraph IV litigation against the generic manufacturers.
66
 The 
FDA approved Actavis’ first-to-file product, but the parties settled soon 
 
 
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., 133 S. Ct. 2849 
(2013), and reinstatement granted, Nos. 10-2077, 10-4571, 2013 WL 5180857 (3d Cir. Sept. 9, 2013). 
 56. Id. at 208. 
 57. Id. at 218. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Merck & Co. acquired Schering and the K-Dur patent after the settlements, but prior to the 
Third Circuit litigation. Id. at 203 n.2. 
 60. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co., (2012) (No. 12-245), 
2012 WL 3645102. 
 61. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1303–05, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 
sub nom, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 787 (2012) (No. 12-416). 
 62. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Watson, 677 F.3d 1298 (No. 12-416), 2012 WL 4750283. 
 63. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 787 (No. 12-416). 
 64. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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thereafter.
67
 The settlement required that Actavis refrain from introducing 
its generic drug until sixty-five months prior to the expiration of Solvay’s 
patent and that Solvay pay each generic manufacturer millions of dollars.
68
 
The FTC alleged that payments were intended to “compensate the generics 
for agreeing not to compete against AndroGel.”69 
The Supreme Court declined to follow the Eleventh Circuit’s 
conclusion that the scope of the patent prevented the FTC from trying its 
case, finding that the “patent-related factor should not determine the 
result.”70 The Court identified five “considerations” that necessitated its 
conclusion: (1) the restraint at issue had the potential to adversely affect 
competition; (2) any resulting anticompetitive consequences will 
sometimes be unjustified; (3) the patent holder likely possesses the power 
to bring about anticompetitive harm; (4) antitrust actions are generally 
feasible; and (5) the risk of antitrust liability does not prevent parties from 
settling.
71
 Further, the Court specifically noted that  
the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive 
effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor's 
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other 
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any 
other convincing justification. The existence and degree of any 
anticompetitive consequence may also vary as among industries.
72
 
Such complexities require that plaintiff “must prove its case as in other 
rule-of-reason cases.”73 
This reasoning led the Court to two holdings. First, “reverse payment 
settlements [in patent infringement suits] can sometimes violate the 
antitrust laws.”74 This holding required the abrogation of the Federal 
Circuit’s endorsement of the scope of the patent test in In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride
75
 and the Second Circuit’s holding in In re Tamoxifen 
 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. “Solvay agreed to pay millions of dollars to each generic—$12 million in total to Paddock; 
$60 million in total to Par; and an estimated $19–$30 million annually, for nine years, to Actavis.” Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 2234. 
 71. Id. at 2234–37. 
 72. Id. at 2237. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2227. 
 75. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332–37 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
abrogated by Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (holding that Hatch-Waxman-related settlements are generally 
immune from antitrust attack as “there is no legal basis for restricting the right of a patentee to choose 
its preferred means of enforcement”); see supra text accompanying note 44. 
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Citrate that there is no cognizable antitrust claim unless the patent was 
procured by fraud.
76
 Second, reverse payment settlements are not immune 
from antitrust attack even if the anticompetitive effects fall within the 
scope of the patent.
77
  
The Court’s holdings demonstrate a preference for antitrust analysis in 
areas of overlap between patent and antitrust law. However, they also 
eliminated precedent without providing a clear analytical framework for 
future reverse payment settlement cases. Throughout the opinion, the 
Court rejected the idea that these settlements are either per se 
anticompetitive
78
 or per se legal,
79
 and also severely undercut, if not 
outright eliminated, the scope of the patent test.
80
 It instead noted the 
existence of “a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness [and] the quality 
of proof required should vary with the circumstances.”81 However, the 
Court provided little guidance for “appraising reasonableness,” instructing 
only that “trial courts can structure antitrust litigation” so as to achieve the 
appropriate balancing of interests.
82
 Accordingly, the Court “[left] to the 
lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust 
litigation.”83 With little guidance and undercut precedents, courts have a 
dangerous probability of producing another circuit split on reverse 
payment settlements. 
III. COMPETITIVE CONCERNS OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND 
MERGERS 
Because the Court expressed elevated concerns for antitrust violations 
in Actavis,
84
 any proposed analysis framework must consider the entire 
scope of antitrust issues. As such, the necessary first steps are identifying 
 
 
 76. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2006) abrogated by 
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (“Whatever damage is done to competition by settlement is done pursuant to 
the monopoly extended to the patent holder . . . unless the terms of the settlement enlarge the scope of 
that monopoly.”); see supra text accompanying note 40. 
 77. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2230. 
 78. Id. at 2235–36 (“Anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes prove unjustified. . . . 
[O]ffsetting or redeeming virtues are sometimes present.”) 
 79. Id. at 2232 (“[T]his Court's precedents make clear that patent-related settlement agreements 
can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”). 
 80. Id. at 2230 (“And we are willing to take . . . as evidence that the agreement’s anticompetitive 
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent. But we do not agree that that 
fact, or characterization, can immunize the agreement from antitrust attack.”) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. Id. at 2237–38 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. Id. at 2238. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 2230. 
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the anticompetitive concerns involved in reverse payment settlements and 
identifying an analysis framework that can properly evaluate those 
concerns. 
A. Anticompetitive Concerns of Reverse Payment Settlements 
The most prevalent anticompetitive concern of reverse payment 
settlements is that such settlements constitute an unreasonable restraint of 
trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
85
 These settlements 
eliminate a competitor and axiomatically reduce (or at least significantly 
delay) competition in the market.
86
 Consumers consequently do not 
receive the benefit of the competition (in the form of lower prices) that 
would have been available but for the settlement.
87
 
Reverse payment settlements also elicit scrutiny because a large cash 
payment from the brand manufacturer to the generic manufacturer can be 
viewed as a de facto profit sharing arrangement.
88
 In return for agreeing to 
refrain from (or to delay) entering the market, the generic manufacturer 
receives a share of the branded manufacturer’s monopoly profits—a share 
that is likely larger than the profits the generic manufacturer would realize 
if it actually entered the market.
89
 A payment to a competitor with the 
purpose of preventing competition directly contravenes Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.
90
 
Congress recognized the potential for anticompetitive effects in reverse 
payment settlements. In response, it included a provision in the Medicare 
Modernization Act requiring that any agreement between a brand drug 
company and a generic drug company relating to the manufacturing, 
marketing, or sale of a drug be submitted to the Federal Trade 
Commission and Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice for 
antitrust review.
91
 This provision allows the agencies to continually and 
effectively monitor the pharmaceutical industry for anticompetitive 
 
 
 85. Khatibifar, supra note 2, at 1374; see also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 86. Han, supra note 21, at 915. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 915–16. 
 89. See Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1580–81. Hemphill further explains that such payments 
result in harm to consumers. Id. at 1572–73 (“Economic modeling has shown formally that settlements 
that include a cash payment from the patentee to the infringer provide consumers with less welfare, on 
average, than seeing the litigation to completion.”).  
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”).  
 91. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-
173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461–63 (2003); see also Carrier, supra note 1, at 49. 
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settlements and puts the settling parties on notice that any settlement 
reached may be subjected to antitrust scrutiny. Notably, this requirement 
parallels the requirement that the parties to a merger notify the FTC and 
DOJ of the proposed merger under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust 
Improvement Act of 1976.
92
 
B. Anticompetitive Concerns of Mergers 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission each have the authority to review mergers between 
firms to see if the merger poses a risk of anticompetitive effects that will 
harm consumers.
93
 A horizontal merger
94
 has two potential types of 
anticompetitive effects: coordinated effects and unilateral effects. 
Coordinated effects are “cartel-like” effects.95 If a merger has 
coordinated effects, “the merger will produce a change in market structure 
or environment that will probably lead the firms to behave less rivalrously 
or more cartel-like.”96 The implication of coordinated effects is that tacit 
cooperation, if not outright agreements, between the remaining firms 
regarding pricing and production levels becomes much easier.
97
 These 
restraints harm consumers in the form of increased prices, lower supply of 
products, lower quality products, and a smaller variety of products from 
which to choose.
98
 
Unilateral effects are “[t]he elimination of competition between two 
firms that results from their merger [that] may alone constitute a 
substantial lessening of competition.”99 These effects are most prevalent in 
a merger to monopoly, though such a merger is not required.
100
 Common 
unilateral effects include increased prices, decreased output, diminished 
innovation, and a reduction in product variety—concerns mirroring those 
emanating from a monopolist.
101
 Unilateral effects are of particular 
 
 
 92. See infra Part III.B. 
 93. ELEANOR M. FOX, CASES AND MATERIALS ON U.S. ANTITRUST IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 57 (3d 
ed. 2012).  
 94. A horizontal merger is a merger between two firms that are competitors (or potential 
competitors). Id. at 369.  
 95. Id. at 370. 
 96. Id. at 381. 
 97. DOJ & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 7 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL 
MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/ 
100819hmg.pdf. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. § 6, at 20. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. § 6.1–6.4. 
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concern when a merger takes place within an oligopolistic market—that is, 
a market in which there are few firms.
102
 
Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,
103
 
merging parties must notify the agencies of mergers meeting a set of 
defined criteria.
104
 Such premerger notification filings (“HSR filings”) 
provide the initial information used by the agencies to determine if the 
merger has potential anticompetitive effects.
105
 These filings also provide 
a process by which the agencies can gather more information or seek to 
enjoin the merger if they deem the potential coordinated or unilateral 
effects to have an adverse impact on competition.
106
 
Both coordinated and unilateral effects are implicated when a merger 
takes place within a concentrated industry. However, to determine the 
extent of these effects and their likely impact on consumers and 
competition, a full analysis of the market structure is necessary. This 
analysis is discussed later in this Note.
107
  
C. Collateral Applications of Antitrust Analyses 
Courts do not necessarily restrict the application of a particular type of 
analysis to the particular problem the analysis was designed to address. 
Instead, overlaps between statutory purposes and legal concerns may 
allow the expansion of a particular analysis into new areas of law. For 
instance, in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
108
 
the Supreme Court was presented with a predatory pricing case brought 
 
 
 102. FOX, supra note 93, at 409. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012). 
 104. The parties must notify the agencies of any merger which would result in the acquirer 
holding securities of the acquired party in excess of $303.4 million, or in excess of $75.9 million if the 
acquirer meets other criteria described in the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a); Revised Jurisdictional 
Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3814 (Feb. 24, 2014) (to be codified at 16 
C.F.R. pts. 801-03). 
 105. An HSR filing must identify and describe the parties involved in the transaction. The 
reporting parties must provide copies of documents filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, balance sheets, and other financial data. The parties must also submit forward-looking 
documents that describe the planning and evaluation of the proposed merger. See FTC, WHAT IS THE 
PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PROGRAM?: AN OVERVIEW 6 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/attachments/premerger-introductory-guides/guide1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
M376-KE8V. 
 106. Id. at 9–14. 
 107. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 108. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
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under the Robinson-Patman Act.
109
 However, the particular analysis set 
forth by the Court has become the standard framework for assessing 
predation claims under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
110
 
The agencies have acknowledged the potential for merger analysis to 
be applied in non-acquisition contexts. In the Antitrust Guidelines for the 
Licensing of Intellectual Property,
111
 the agencies explain that merger 
analysis is appropriate when two firms behave as if combining, but do not 
enter into a merger.
112
 Though these guidelines offer two typical 
scenarios
113
 and an example involving two pharmaceutical products
114
 in 
which a merger analysis can be applied, neither the scenarios nor the 
example encompass a standard
115
 reverse payment settlement.
116
 However, 
 
 
 109. Generally, the Robinson-Patman Act, which amended Section 2 of the Clayton Act, prohibits 
a firm from selling its products to similarly situated buyers at different prices where such sales have 
the effect of lessening competition. FOX, supra note 93, at 260. 
 110. Brooke Group was not a Sherman Act Section 2 case because the defendant was not a 
monopolist, meaning Sherman Act causes of action were not available. However, the goals of 
analyzing predatory pricing claims are largely the same regardless of the relationship between the 
parties, so the Brooke Group analysis “set the standard for Section 2 predation law.” Id. at 266. 
 111. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
(1995) [hereinafter ANTITRUST IP GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
attachments/competition-policy-guidance/0558.pdf. 
 112. Id. § 5.7, Example 11.  
 113. The guidelines allow for a merger analysis to be applied (1) when there is “an outright sale 
by an intellectual property owner of all of its rights to that intellectual property” or (2) when there is “a 
transaction in which a person obtains through grant, sale, or other transfer an exclusive license for 
intellectual property.” Id. § 5.7. 
 114. The example scenario states that 
Omega develops a new, patented pharmaceutical for the treatment of a particular disease. The 
only drug on the market approved for the treatment of this disease is sold by Delta. Omega's 
patented drug has almost completed regulatory approval. . . . Omega’s drug would be a 
significant competitor to Delta’s. However, rather than enter the market as a direct competitor 
of Delta, Omega licenses to Delta the right to manufacture and sell Omega’s patented drug 
. . . . 
Id. § 5.7, Example 11. The guidelines explain, “The facts of this example indicate that Omega would 
be a likely potential competitor of Delta in the absence of the licensing arrangement, and thus they are 
in a horizontal relationship in the relevant goods market that includes drugs for the treatment of this 
particular disease.” Id. There is a horizontal posture and loss of potential competition, so “[t]he 
evaluating Agency would apply a merger analysis to this transaction, since it involves an acquisition of 
a likely potential competitor.” Id. 
 115. Here, “standard” refers to a settlement that includes a payment from the brand manufacturer 
to the generic manufacturer as compensation for the latter delaying entry into the market. 
 116. Scenario 1 in note 113 does not apply because the brand manufacturer is not selling its 
intellectual property to the generic manufacturer. This is true even if a settlement includes the brand 
manufacturer licensing its intellectual property to the generic because it is not selling “all of its rights 
to that property.” Id. (emphasis added). Scenario 2 in note 113 does not apply because even if the 
generic is able to negotiate both entry into the market and use of the intellectual property before the 
expiration of the patent, it will not become the exclusive seller of the drug. For use of the property to 
trigger a merger analysis under scenario 2, the generic manufacturer must use “a license that precludes 
all other persons, including the licensor, from using the licensed intellectual property.” Id. (emphasis 
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Section 5.7 of these guidelines provides an important stepping stone 
toward applying merger analysis to reverse payment settlements. 
IV. MERGER ANALYSIS: TOOLS AND CASES 
The second step in identifying a proper framework for analyzing 
reverse payment settlements is identifying a systematic approach that can 
be applied to address the anticompetitive concerns raised by the 
settlements. This section explores the techniques used in merger analysis 
to evaluate if they are suitable for a collateral application to reverse 
payment settlements. 
A. General Overview of Merger Techniques and Analysis 
The Department of Justice first issued a set of merger guidelines in 
1968.
117
 These guidelines have been updated several times since, most 
recently in 2010.
118
 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (hereinafter 
“Merger Guidelines”) are largely intended to inform businesses of how the 
agencies are likely to assess horizontal mergers.
119
 The standard analysis 
generally involves defining a product market, assessing the level of 
competition in the market, and predicting the likelihood of anticompetitive 
effects.
120
 
1. Market Definition 
When a product sold by one firm competes against a product sold by 
another firm, those products are considered to be in the same market. 
According to the Merger Guidelines, market definition plays two roles: it 
“helps specify the line of commerce and section of the country in which 
the competitive concern arises” and it “allows the Agencies to identify 
 
 
added). Though only illustrative, Example 11 does not apply because it involves a market incumbent, 
Delta, purchasing new intellectual property from a potential competitor, Omega. Id. § 5.7, Example 11. 
This is different from a reverse payment settlement because while an incumbent brand manufacturer 
buys only a longer exclusive market from a generic manufacturer in a reverse payment settlement, 
Omega actually purchases new intellectual property from Delta. Such a purchase is more likely to be 
obviously anticompetitive to “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics” and 
thus pass the scrutiny of Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). In short, reverse 
payment settlements do not fall within the scope of merger analysis under Section 5.7 and thus require 
a new imputation into cases based on Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 117. FOX, supra note 93, at 369. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 370.  
 120. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, § 1. 
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market participants and measure market shares and market 
concentration.”121 Traditionally, the “outer boundaries of a product market 
are determined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-
elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for it.”122 
Thus, market definition focuses on a customer’s ability and willingness to 
substitute to a different product in response to a price increase.
123
 
To find the point at which customers will substitute products, the 
agencies employ the “hypothetical monopolist test.”124 This test assumes 
that a single hypothetical monopolist controlling all products in a proposed 
market imposes a small but significant and non-transitory increase in price 
(“SSNIP”)125 on its products.126 If the SSNIP is profitable for the 
hypothetical monopolist—that is, if consumers do not substitute to other 
products—the correct market is identified.127 If customers are able to 
substitute to other products, the market is enlarged to include the 
substitutable products and the process is repeated until the proper market 
is identified.
128
  
2. Market Shares, Concentration, and Presumptions 
Once a market has been defined, the agencies measure market shares 
and market concentration to help determine the likelihood of 
anticompetitive effects.
129
 Market shares are generally considered useful 
indicators of a firm’s competitive significance in the relevant market.130 
 
 
 121. Id. § 4, at 7. 
 122. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). The Court immediately 
recognized the potential need for narrower submarkets in some instances: “The boundaries of such a 
submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of 
the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique 
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized 
vendors.” Id. 
 123. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, § 4. 
 124. Id. § 4.1.1. 
 125. The SSNIP is usually 5%. Id. § 4.1.2. 
 126. Id. § 4.1.1. 
 127. FOX, supra note 93, at 370. For example, suppose we want to identify the relevant market for 
Coke. We observe that if the price of Coke is increased by 5%, customers substitute Pepsi for Coke. If 
the prices of Coke and Pepsi are increased by 5%, customers do not substitute to a third product (for 
example, water) and pay the higher price. The relevant market, therefore, is Coke and Pepsi. 
 128. Id. 
 129. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, § 5 (explaining that market shares are 
important because “if a price reduction to gain new customers would also apply to a firm’s existing 
customers, a firm with a large market share may be more reluctant to implement a price reduction than 
one with a small share. Likewise, a firm with a large market share may not feel pressure to reduce 
price even if a smaller rival does.”). 
 130. Id. § 5.2. Market shares are usually calculated based on revenues rather than unit sales. Id. 
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In combination with the number of participants in a particular market, 
market shares reveal the market’s concentration. The agencies measure 
market concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) of 
market concentration.
131
 By calculating a market’s HHI both before and 
after a proposed merger, the agencies can measure the change in market 
concentration.
132
 By measuring the change in market concentration, the 
agencies can determine the likelihood of unilateral or coordinated effects 
of the merger.
133
 
The Merger Guidelines are based on the contention that “mergers 
should not be permitted to create, enhance, or entrench market power or to 
facilitate its exercise.”134 As such, the agencies view mergers showing 
large HHI increases skeptically. The agencies apply concentration 
characterizations of “unconcentrated markets,”135 “moderately 
concentrated markets,”136 and “highly concentrated markets”137 based on 
the market’s pre-merger HHI. In highly concentrated markets, such as 
those likely to be encountered in the pharmaceutical industry, mergers that 
increase the HHI by 100 to 200 points “potentially raise significant 
competitive concerns” and mergers that increase the HHI by more than 
200 points are “presumed to be likely to enhance market power.”138 
However, such a presumption “may be rebutted by persuasive evidence 
showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.”139 This 
structure of presumptions and rebuttals mirrors the analysis of the 
Supreme Court in pre-Merger Guidelines cases.
140
  
 
 
§ 5.2, at 17 (“Revenues in the relevant market tend to be the best measure of attractiveness to 
customers, since they reflect the real-world ability of firms to surmount all of the obstacles necessary 
to offer products on terms and conditions that are attractive to customers.”). 
 131. Id. § 5.3. An HHI is calculated by summing the square of each firm’s market share. For 
example, an industry with three firms having 50%, 30%, and 20% market shares would have an HHI 
of 3,800 (502 + 302 + 202 = 3,800). The HHI can range from 10,000 (a pure monopolist) to a number 
approaching zero (an “atomistic market”). Id. § 5.3 n.9. 
 132. Id. § 5.3. 
 133. Id.; see supra Part III.B. 
 134. Id. § 1. 
 135. HHI below 1500. Id. § 5.3. 
 136. HHI between 1500 and 2500. Id. 
 137. HHI above 2500. Id. 
 138. Id. § 5.3, at 19. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) (“Specifically, we 
think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant 
market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so 
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence 
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.”). 
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B. Analysis of Concentrated Industries 
In 1974, the Supreme Court decided United States v. General 
Dynamics.
141
 The Department of Justice challenged a merger of coal 
companies based on market concentration as reflected by current market 
shares.
142
 However, the Court reasoned that market shares did not 
accurately reflect any given coal company’s future ability to compete.143 
The merging companies showed that the structure of the coal industry 
made current market shares misleading and, contrary to the presumption 
that mergers in concentrated industries are anticompetitive,
144
 the merger 
would not likely produce an increase in market power.
145
 General 
Dynamics marked a shift to “demand[ing] harder proof from the plaintiff 
that any given merger would probably increase market power, raise price 
and lower output.”146 
C. Analysis of Precluding Competition Through Mergers 
As discussed in Part III, merger analysis is concerned with the potential 
for a substantial lessening of competition when two competitors combine 
into a single entity. This concern also extends to a merger between an 
existing firm and a potential competitor.
147
 Potential competition claims 
 
 
 141. 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 142. Id. at 494 (explaining that the government based its challenge on “statistics showing that . . . 
the coal industry was concentrated among a small number of large producers; that this concentration 
was increasing; and that the acquisition . . . would materially enlarge the market share of the acquiring 
company . . . .”). 
 143. Id. at 501. 
 144. This merger predated the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in their current form. However, the 
inference of market power from market share statistics was still the governing merger analysis at the 
time. See supra note 140.  
 145. In short, the Court found that coal was largely consumed by utility companies. Because the 
survival of the utility companies depended on an uninterrupted supply of coal, the utilities demanded 
to purchase coal under long-term contracts. As such, measuring market shares with current revenues 
did not accurately measure each firm’s ability to compete in the future. Even future sales would not be 
an appropriate measure because much of each company’s unmined coal had already been committed to 
a customer under long-term contracts. Instead, the proper measure of future competitiveness was the 
uncommitted coal in each company’s reserves. Because the reserves of one of the two merging parties 
were nearly depleted, the merger could not harm future competition and therefore was not divested. 
General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 501–04. 
 146. FOX, supra note 93, at 369. 
 147. See, e.g., Darren S. Tucker, Potential Competition Analysis Under the 2010 Merger 
Guidelines, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 273, 273 (2011). The prevalence of the potential competition doctrine 
has waned since the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 
U.S. 602 (1974). There, the Court required a showing that one of the merging firms “has the 
characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render it a perceived potential de novo entrant, 
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require both a concentrated market and few other competitors with the 
potential to enter the market—if these conditions are not met, “the 
elimination of a potential entrant would be competitively irrelevant.”148 
Though some circuits have expressed concern over difficulty of proving 
anticompetitive harm under the potential competition doctrine,
149
 the 2010 
iteration of the Merger Guidelines explicitly refers to potential 
competition,
150
 the first time since 1984 that such a reference has been 
made.
151
  
The Merger Guidelines apply the standard horizontal merger 
framework to the acquisition of a firm that is outside the market but 
committed to entering.
152
 The Merger Guidelines also note the particularly 
acute threat to competition when a competitor is prevented from entering 
the market.
153
 While not devoting the same level of attention as the 1984 
Merger Guidelines did,
154
 the 2010 Merger Guidelines identify five 
objective factors to be considered in assessing a horizontal merger with a 
potential competitor: market concentration, barriers to entry, relative entry 
capabilities, incumbent market share, and potential efficiencies.
155
 These 
five factors are precisely those that complicate pharmaceutical markets 
and are thus the factors that must be considered in evaluating potentially 
anticompetitive behavior by drug manufacturers.  
 
 
and . . . [its] premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempered oligopolistic 
behavior on the part of existing participants in that market.” Id. at 624–25. 
 148. Tucker, supra note 147, at 273–74. 
 149. The First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have expressed concerns with implementing the 
potential competition doctrine and have refused to rule on the doctrine. See, e.g., Fraser v. Major 
League Soccer, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 70–71 (1st Cir. 2002); Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 355 
(2d Cir. 1982); FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 293–94 (4th Cir. 1977); Republic of Tex. 
Corp. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F.2d 1026, 1048 (5th Cir. 1981). The Eighth 
Circuit has accepted the potential competition doctrine. See, e.g., Ginsburg v. InBev NV/SA, 623 F.3d 
1229, 1234 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 150. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, § 1 (“These Guidelines outline the 
principal analytical techniques, practices, and the enforcement policy . . . with respect to mergers and 
acquisitions involving actual or potential competitors . . . .”). 
 151. Tucker, supra note 147, at 278. 
 152. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, § 9 (“Firms that have, prior to the 
merger, committed to entering the market also will normally be treated as market participants.”). 
 153. Id. § 5.3 (“A merger between an incumbent and a potential entrant can raise significant 
competitive concerns. The lessening of competition resulting from such a merger is more likely to be 
substantial, the larger is the market share of the incumbent, the greater is the competitive significance 
of the potential entrant, and the greater is the competitive threat posed by this potential entrant relative 
to others.”). 
 154. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1984 MERGER GUIDELINES §§ 4.131–135 (1984), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.pdf. 
 155. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, §§ 5.1–3. 
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V. APPLICATION OF MERGER ANALYSIS TO REVERSE PAYMENT 
SETTLEMENTS 
After confirming the parallel anticompetitive concerns of reverse 
payment settlements and mergers, and identifying the techniques involved 
in merger analysis, the next step is to apply merger analysis to these 
settlements. This Part evaluates the potential for such collateral 
application. 
A. Application of Merger Analysis Is Appropriate 
The ultimate anticompetitive concerns of reverse payment settlements 
and mergers are the same: a competitor (or potential competitor) is 
removed from the market leaving the remaining firm(s) with market power 
and the ability to charge supracompetitive prices.
156
 As discussed in Part 
III, merger analysis has been imputed to other areas of law—most notably 
the acquisition of intellectual property rights under the 1995 Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property.
157
 While reverse 
payment settlements are fundamentally different than intellectual property 
acquisition,
158
 a variation of a common logical foundation applies: where 
there had previously been competition, there is now cooperation. 
 
 
 156. See supra Part III.A. 
 157. ANTITRUST IP GUIDELINES, supra note 111, § 5.7.  
 158. Reverse payment settlements generally involve an intellectual property holder paying a 
competitor to abandon its pursuit of the property (or its substantial equivalent). Thus, no intellectual 
property is disclosed and the number of producers is not increased. Contrarily, an intellectual property 
acquisition increases the number of producers of a given product and has the potential to increase 
competition. While some reverse payment settlements involve an eventual licensing of intellectual 
property to the generic manufacturer, the licensing usually occurs after a period of time during which 
the generic agrees to stay out of the market. The licensing ultimately results in at least the same 
amount of harm to consumers as an agreement to abandon generic manufacturing. For example, 
suppose a brand manufacturer has five years remaining on its patent. As part of the settlement, the 
brand manufacturer may agree to license the intellectual property to the generic manufacturer after 
three years. This provides the brand manufacturer with three more years of monopoly power and two 
years of a duopoly likely subject to coordinated effects. The generic manufacturer receives a two-year 
period as the exclusive generic manufacturer, more than four times the exclusivity period provided by 
Hatch-Waxman. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Since under Hatch-Waxman settlements 
can undercut the authority of the FDA to approve subsequent generic ANDAs, the brand 
manufacturer’s patent cannot be challenged again. Hemphill, supra note 26, at 1586–88. Consumers 
thus lose the benefit of having the patent challenged, of potential earlier entry by the first-filing 
generic, and of entry by additional generics after the statutorily-provided 180-day exclusivity period 
for the first-filing generic. In short, such licensing arrangements have the potential to inflict the same 
harm on consumers as settlements in which the brand manufacturer simply pays the generic to delay 
entry. 
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The development of merger analysis over the last several decades 
proves particularly useful in assessing the pharmaceutical industry. By its 
nature, the industry is segmented into potentially well-defined 
submarkets.
159
 These submarkets are likely to be highly concentrated and 
require more nuanced analysis than a mechanical application of before-
and-after market share statistics.
160
 Merger analysis includes techniques
161
 
that address these exact issues and allows for a complete and accurate 
assessment of the competitive effects of a reverse payment settlement. 
B. Industry Analysis and Market Definition 
The flexibility of market definition afforded by merger analysis ensures 
that only those reverse payment settlements that pose threats to 
competition and consumers are likely to be subjected to intense scrutiny 
and possible injunction. A properly defined market, an aspect that is 
problematic in many analyses of the pharmaceutical industry,
162
 is the first 
step toward determining whether a given settlement will harm competition 
and violate antitrust laws.
163
 
Market definition within the pharmaceutical industry is a complicated 
task. The natural starting point is functionally equivalent drugs. Several 
branded and generic drugs are often designed to treat the same condition. 
For example, at least five variations of drugs designed to treat depression 
are sold under seven brand names.
164
 Additionally, four of these drugs are 
 
 
 159. Each pharmaceutical product treats a limited number of conditions or symptoms, so the 
choices available to consumers are always much narrower than “all pharmaceutical products.” The 
“practical indicia” of submarkets described by the Court in Brown Shoe support narrow market 
definitions for pharmaceutical products. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 
(1962). 
 160. Cf. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (finding that uncommitted 
coal reserves, not current market shares, accurately measured each firm’s future ability to compete). 
 161. See supra Part IV. 
 162. See generally Anish Vaishnav, Note, Product Market Definition in Pharmaceutical Antitrust 
Cases: Evaluating Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 586. 
 163. Only per se analyses disregard market definition. LOUIS ALTMAN AND MALLA POLLACK, 
CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:31, at 4-308 (4th ed. 
2009). Because Actavis instructs that reverse payment settlements are to be analyzed under the rule of 
reason, market definition is a necessary step of the analysis. See id.; FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 
2223, 2237 (2013). 
 164. Opderbeck, supra note 3, at 1334. The generics and their branded versions are citalopram 
(Celexa), escitalopram (Lexapro), fluoxetine (Prozac), paroxetine (Paxil, Paxil CR, Pexeva), and 
sertraline (Zoloft). Mayo Clinic Staff, Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRIs), MAYO CLINIC 
(July 9, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/depression/in-depth/ssris/art-20044825, 
archived at http://perma.cc/K446-5GWR.  
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made with expired patents and thus generics have entered the market.
165
 
Even when the FDA declares drugs to be “bioequivalent,” however, 
patients do not necessarily uniformly respond to treatment.
166
 Therefore, 
for the individual consumer, the range of substitutable products may be 
narrower than “therapeutic equivalence” suggests. Because the boundaries 
of substitution may vary by the individual consumer, precise market 
definition may be impossible.
167
 
However, even “broad” pharmaceutical markets—that is, markets not 
limited to a brand drug and its equivalent generic
168—are highly 
concentrated. For example, consider the market for drugs approved by the 
FDA to treat fibromyalgia as described in Professor Opderbeck’s Rational 
Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in Hatch-Waxman 
Patent Litigation.
169
 The market centers on a brand drug (Lyrica) with no 
generic competition, but which faces products of potential therapeutic 
equivalence produced by two brand manufacturers and nine generic 
manufacturers.
170
 Despite the presence of eleven different manufacturers, 
 
 
 165. The patents for Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, and Celexa expired between 2001 and 2006. Haiden A. 
Huskamp et al., Generic Entry, Reformulations and Promotion of SSRIs in the US, 26 
PHARMACOECOMOMICS 603, 604 (2008). See also Opderbeck, supra note 3, at 1334. 
 166. Opderbeck, supra note 3, at 1334–35. 
 167. The degree to which consumers can substitute between products places constraints on the 
pricing of each product. Pharmaceuticals, however, complicate such substitution and constraints. 
Suppose drugs A and B are therapeutically equivalent and both treat disease C. Drug B, however, 
causes unpleasant side effects in a large number of patients while drug A does not. These side effects 
will likely prevent many users of drug A from switching to drug B if the price of A increases (or the 
price of B decreases). In this case, drug B does not constrain the price of drug A and, because there is 
little (if any) substitution by patients suffering from disease C, the two drugs may not belong in the 
same product market. Therefore, the appearance of competition, but not actual competition, may exist.  
 168. This definition of a “broad” market is undoubtedly narrower than reality. However, the major 
obstacle of imputing merger analysis into reverse payment settlement evaluation is squaring the 
presumptive invalidity of mergers in highly concentrated industries, see supra note 138 and 
accompanying text, with the presumptive validity of a patent, see infra note 203. If the imputation is 
successful in narrow, concentrated markets, the analysis will apply equally well to broad, diffuse 
markets. The conservative approach, therefore, is to test the analysis in markets that may be too 
narrowly defined.  
 169. Opderbeck, supra note 3, at 1343–44. Opderbeck stresses the importance of market definition 
in assessing the legality of a reverse payment settlement. 
 170.  
MANUFACTURER DRUG GENERIC 
EQUIVALENT 
SALES  
(MILLIONS USD)  
MARKET 
SHARE 
Pfizer 
Lyrica Pregabalin $2,573 
75% Neurontin Gabapentin $387 
Dilantin Phenytoin $30 
Novartis Tegretol Carbamazepine $451 11% 
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the HHI for the market is 5,853—well above the Merger Guidelines’ 
“highly concentrated” threshold of 2,500.171 This level of concentration is 
not surprising given the high barriers to entry associated with 
pharmaceutical markets.
172
 The major complication is determining how 
much of this concentration results from the brand manufacturer holding a 
lawful patent. Regardless, the concentration of pharmaceutical markets 
requires careful analysis to minimize the risk of adverse coordinated or 
unilateral effects of settlements. 
Despite the potential difficulties of market definition, the exercise is 
usually necessary to assess anticompetitive effects. Fortunately, the 
approach to market definition under merger analysis encourages 
examination of the “practical indicia” of the relevant submarket173 and 
evidence of competitive effects.
174
 Thus, merger analysis renders a more 
 
 
MANUFACTURER DRUG GENERIC 
EQUIVALENT 
SALES  
(MILLIONS USD)  
MARKET 
SHARE 
Teva Gabapentin -- $85 2% 
Alpharma 
Gabapentin -- $85 
3% 
Phenytoin -- $30 
Ivax Gabapentin -- $85 2% 
Glenmark Gabapentin -- $85 2% 
Morton Grove Phenytoin -- $30 1% 
Precision Dose Phenytoin -- $30 1% 
Taro Phenytoin -- $30 1% 
UDL Phenytoin -- $30 1% 
Xactdose Phenytoin -- $30 1% 
 
Market shares as of 2008. Id. at 1344. 
 171. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical 
Industry Mergers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 255, 265 (1999) (noting that in a highly concentrated drug 
market “[b]arriers to entry were high because of the need to undertake the difficult, expensive, and 
time-consuming process of researching and developing a new product, obtaining FDA approval, and 
gaining customer acceptance”). 
 173. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (“The boundaries of such a 
submarket may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of 
the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique 
production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized 
vendors.”). 
 174. Vaishnav, supra note 162, at 590 (explaining that the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
“allow[] for reliance on direct evidence of competitive effects” which allows for a more flexible 
approach to market definition than is taken when defining a market for a Sherman Act § 2 
monopolization claim). 
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precise market than a mechanical application of cross-elasticity of demand 
principles. 
C. Effect on Prices 
The importance of the market definition process is slightly diminished 
when actions cause observable changes in a market.
175
 For example, if a 
new product enters the market at a lower price and several other products 
lower their prices to remain competitive, it can be safely assumed that all 
of the products are in the same market.
176
 The effect of a generic entrant 
on the price of a branded drug has been studied in great detail.
177
 The 
precise price effects are outside the scope of this Note. Pricing is instead 
relevant to the extent that it helps identify potential anticompetitive effects 
of a particular reverse payment settlement. 
1. Notable Market Features 
Three features of pharmaceutical markets must be kept in mind when 
observing actual effects in a given market. First, a brand drug and its 
generic are identical, so they do not compete on quality.
178
 Second, some 
consumers are loyal to brand drugs and are reluctant to switch to a generic 
medication.
179
 Third, health insurance often covers some, if not all, of the 
 
 
 175. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986) (“Since the purpose of the 
inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the 
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a 
reduction of output, can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power . . . .”) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price Competition in 
Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J.L. & ECON. 331, 337 (1992) (explaining the “negative 
relationship that states that the higher generic penetration is, the lower the market price will be”). 
 177. See, e.g., Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, Generic Entry and the Pricing of 
Pharmaceuticals, 6 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 75 (1997); Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 176; 
FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM IMPACT (2011), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-
term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission/authorized-generic-drugs-short-
term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission.pdf. 
 178. Bioequivalence is defined by the FDA as “the absence of a significant difference in the rate 
and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or 
pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when administered at the same 
molar dose under similar conditions.” 21 C.F.R. 320.1(e) (2013). A generic manufacturer must assert 
that its product is bioequivalent to an approved drug when filing an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application with the FDA. Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012). Thus, a brand 
drug and its generic cannot compete on quality. 
 179. Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 176, at 340 (“The strength of brand loyalties is 
demonstrated by the fact that, on average, pioneers keep about half their market in units despite the 
fact that generics are roughly one-third the price of pioneers . . . .”). 
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price of pharmaceuticals, so end consumers are not always responsive to 
prices.
180
 The precise implications of these characteristics may not be 
obvious or constant for all drugs, but the important observation is that 
many consumers switch to the generic drug once it is available.
181
 
2. Use of Generics  
A 2010 FTC study
182
 shows that not only do many consumers switch to 
generics, but that oligopolistic pharmaceutical markets are susceptible to 
the type of potentially anticompetitive effects discussed in Part III. The 
study found that a market for generic drugs takes approximately one year 
to mature.
183
 Thus, it should be expected that the generic will initially 
charge a supracompetitive price,
184
 but then the generic price will decline 
over time.
185
 Once the generic market is mature, the average generic price 
 
 
 180. Vaishnav, supra note 162, at 612–13 (“[I]t is likely that . . . the patient . . . will remain 
insensitive to (and perhaps, completely oblivious of) prices and price changes. The patient will be 
paying only a fraction of the price of the drug, no matter which drug is prescribed . . . .”) (citation 
omitted). 
 181. The fact that some consumers choose to continue purchasing the brand name drug even with 
the availability of a cheaper bioequivalent generic does not indicate that the drugs are in separate 
markets. Perhaps some consumers feel more comfortable with the brand name drug and the price 
disparity is not large enough to sway them to the generic. See supra note 179. Or perhaps the brand 
drug has launched an extremely effective marketing campaign and has convinced consumers its 
product is better. The Supreme Court has held that a lack of switching, even between chemically 
identical products, is not necessarily an indication that the products are different or belong in different 
markets. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572 (1967) (“Since all liquid bleach is 
chemically identical, advertising and sales promotion are vital. . . . [T]hese heavy expenditures went 
far to explain why Clorox maintained so high a market share despite the fact that its brand . . . retailed 
for a price equal to or, in many instances, higher than its competitors.”). 
 182. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 25. 
 183. Id. at 8. 
 184. Though a generic may initially charge a price above the competitive level, “[t]he general 
pattern is that generic products enter at a significant discount to the [brand] product with which they 
compete.” Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 176, at 335. 
 185. The initial supracompetitive price is not necessarily an anticompetitive price. The antitrust 
laws do not prohibit a firm from charging a price above the competitive price, or even a monopoly 
price. Cf. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
(“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not 
only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.”). Even if the generic sets its 
price based on the brand drug’s price, this is not necessarily indicative of anticompetitive collusion 
because parallel pricing alone is not sufficient to offend the antitrust laws. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 553–54 (2007) (“Even ‘conscious parallelism,’ a common reaction of ‘firms in a 
concentrated market [that] recogniz[e] their shared economic interests and their interdependence with 
respect to price and output decisions’ is ‘not in itself unlawful.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)). Instead, this is 
another illustration of the structure of pharmaceutical markets potentially facilitating anticompetitive 
coordinated effects. 
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is approximately 85% lower than the pre-generic-entry brand drug price.
186
 
The lower prices help shift consumers to the generic drug—about 90% of 
prescriptions (for which a generic is available) are filled using a generic 
drug in mature markets.
187
 
3. The Impact of Pricing and Substitution on Settlement Analysis 
The evidence of consumers switching to generic drugs motivates brand 
manufacturers to prevent generic entry and colors the analysis of reverse 
payment settlements in three ways. First, it lessens the burden of market 
definition. Second, it supports the contention that the potential competition 
doctrine applies to pharmaceutical submarkets. Third, it highlights the 
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment settlements. 
Courts have shown more leniency in accepting a plaintiff’s market 
definition when the plaintiff is able to present evidence of actual 
anticompetitive effects.
188
 While this is not something that can likely be 
shown in reference to any particular reverse payment settlement,
189
 generic 
entry predictably lowers average
190
 drug prices.
191
 The consistency of this 
effect suggests that, but for the reverse payment settlement, average drug 
prices would decrease. The settlements thus keep the available prices 
artificially inflated and may well be anticompetitive. 
The repeated pattern of generic entry followed by lower average prices 
is strong evidence that the potential competition doctrine applies to reverse 
payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. Once the generic has 
filed a Paragraph IV Abbreviated New Drug Application with the FDA,
192
 
it has assumed the posture of a de novo entrant into the market and meets 
 
 
 186. FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra note 25, at 8. 
 187. Id.  
 188. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986). 
 189. In a challenge to a reverse payment settlement, the generic by definition has not entered the 
market. A showing of lower average prices due to entry of the generic is therefore not possible. 
 190. This does not necessarily imply that the brand manufacturer lowers, or even maintains, its 
price. Suppose ten customers buy a brand drug for $10. Suppose further that a generic enters at a price 
of $5, the brand increases its price of $15, and eight customers switch to the generic. The average price 
paid fell from $10 before entry to $7 after. 
 191. See Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 176, at 335–36; Richard E. Caves, Michael D. 
Whinston & Mark A. Hurwitz, Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 1991 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 1, 34–35; FTC, GENERIC 
DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION, supra note 12, at 9. 
 192. Prior to this filing, the generic drug has not initiated, much less gained, FDA approval, so it 
cannot enter the market and thus is not a potential entrant. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 633 (1974) (concluding that National Bank of Commerce could not be a potential 
entrant in part because “[i]t is undisputed that under state law NBC cannot establish de novo branches 
in Spokane”). 
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the preconditions for application of the potential competition doctrine.
193
 
In fact, pharmaceutical markets closely mirror the markets described by 
the Court in Marine Bancorporation as fit for potential competition 
analysis.
194
 Further, the FTC has used the potential competition doctrine in 
actions to prevent one brand manufacturer from acquiring a competing 
brand manufacturer that was developing a competitive product.
195
 
Consumers will likely benefit from the treatment of generics as potential 
competitors in assessing whether a reverse payment settlement has an 
adverse effect on competition. 
The declines in average prices after generic entry also show that, prior 
to generic entry, brand drug manufacturers are usually charging incredibly 
supracompetitive rates.
196
 To properly conceptualize the effect of a reverse 
payment settlement, it is helpful to think of the events as a merger taking 
place in the market after generic entry.
197
 Comparing projected average 
prices in a competitive environment with the actual price being charged by 
the brand manufacturer will likely expose any potentially anticompetitive 
unilateral effects
198
 that result from the settlement.
199
 
 
 
 193. Two preconditions must be met before establishing a potential competition claim under 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. “It must be determined: (i) that in fact [the potential entrant] has 
available feasible means for entering the [market]; and (ii) that those means offer a substantial 
likelihood of ultimately producing deconcentration of that market or other significant procompetitive 
effects.” Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 633.  
 194. See supra notes 147–55 and accompanying text. 
 195. HEALTH CARE DIV., BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST 
ACTIONS IN PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 56–61 (2013), available at 
http://www.ftc.govsites/default/files/attachments/competition-policy-guidance/rxupdate.pdf (listing 
FTC investigations of pharmaceutical mergers that involve the potential competition doctrine), 
archived at http://perma.cc/HZU2-J2F3.  
 196. The maintenance of such high prices indicates that the existence of generic companies in 
general is not sufficient “potential competition” to constrain brand drug pricing. Instead, it is only after 
the generic manufacturer files a Paragraph IV Abbreviated New Drug Application that it becomes a 
sufficient threat to the brand drug that the brand manufacturer will alter its behavior. This altered 
behavior often takes the form of pursuing a reverse payment settlement, FTC, PAY-FOR-DELAY, supra 
note 25, at 3, or the introduction of an “authorized generic” produced by the brand manufacturer but 
sold as a generic drug. See generally FTC, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 177. 
 197. Under a normal merger, two independent firms undergo a transformative event at time t and 
become one firm. In assessing the competitive impact of the merger, part of the agencies’ analyses 
would include comparing the prices available to consumers in the time periods before and after time t. 
 198. These effects are limited to price effects because the brand and generic drugs are 
bioequivalent and cannot compete on quality. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 199. This is not necessarily a condemnation of all reverse payments settlements. While FTC 
research shows that the generic price in a mature market is generally 85% lower than the brand price 
without generic competition, see supra note 186 and accompanying text, this simply recognizes the 
potential for abuse of consumers through settlement. It is these markets and consumers that are most in 
need of protection. Consider, instead, the market for fibromyalgia treatments in note 170, supra. That 
market already provides consumers with several alternative drugs that theoretically place downward 
pricing pressure on Lyrica. If Pfizer, Lyrica’s manufacturer, wanted to enter a reverse payment 
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D. Presumptions and Burdens in Concentrated Pharmaceutical Markets 
Once the market participants have been identified and the market has 
been defined, a court must determine which party bears the burden of 
proving whether a particular settlement violates antitrust laws. Under the 
framework promulgated in the Merger Guidelines, most (if not all) 
markets in the pharmaceutical industry would have HHIs high enough to 
place them in the “highly concentrated” category.200 As such, except in the 
broadest of markets, the Merger Guidelines instruct that the settling parties 
bear the burden of showing industry characteristics such that the reverse 
payment settlement is not likely to substantially lessen competition.
201
  
However, the position of reverse payment settlements at the 
intersection of antitrust law and patent law justifies a break from the 
standard burden presumptions that are generally derived from market 
shares. Though the Supreme Court indicated a preference for antitrust 
scrutiny over pure patent application in Actavis,
202
 this was not an 
instruction to abandon intellectual property rights. Indeed, a brand 
manufacturer’s patent is presumed to be valid until proven otherwise.203 
Further, the decision to bring a patent infringement claim is not entirely 
the decision of the brand manufacturer, but is instead a consequence of the 
structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
204
 Placing a burden on a patent holder 
to prove the validity of its patent due to legislation that gives the patent 
holder the choice of either forfeiting its patent or engaging in costly 
litigation seems at odds with the principles of the patent system. Logic and 
existing patent presumptions dictate that the party seeking to prevent a 
reverse payment settlement should bear the burden of proving its 
anticompetitive effects. 
 
 
settlement with a new generic that is bioequivalent to Lyrica, the potential price effects, and thus 
coordinated and unilateral concerns, would likely be substantially weaker. In short, the analysis would 
treat most harshly the settlements with the greatest potential to harm consumers. 
 200. See supra note 137. 
 201. In highly concentrated industries, even small increases in concentration are presumptively 
anticompetitive. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 202. See supra Part II. 
 203. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. . . . 
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting 
such invalidity.”). 
 204. Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012) (“An abbreviated application 
for a new drug shall contain a certification . . . with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug 
. . . that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug 
. . . .”). To protect the validity of its patent, the brand manufacturer must assert it has a valid patent 
upon which the new generic drug infringes. 
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A strict application of the presumptions of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines is overly harsh. If the rules of thumb provided by the Merger 
Guidelines were stringently applied, all reverse payment settlements 
would have to be invalidated.
205
 However, the discussion of General 
Dynamics
206
 in Part IV.B provides guidance. Under General Dynamics, 
market shares are helpful to the extent that they illustrate firms’ future 
ability to compete.
207
 Two intervening parties complicate the 
pharmaceutical market: physicians and insurance companies. A 
consumer’s choice of which product to purchase208 is often dictated by 
which product the physician recommends
209
 and which product is covered 
by an insurance provider.
210
 The future success of a particular drug is 
likely linked much more closely to persuading doctors and insurance 
companies to support its product than it is to the product’s current market 
share.
211
 The massive budgets pharmaceutical companies allot to their 
marketing departments
212
 illustrate the continuous need to persuade 
consumers and physicians, rather than reliance on fleeting market shares, 
to ensure future competitiveness and success. If current market share 
 
 
 205. For example, even in the “broad” market for Lyrica described supra in note 170, the post-
merger HHI of 5,853 would indicate that any merger in the market would be presumptively illegal. 
This HHI measurement is slightly different from Professor Opderbeck’s HHI calculation (5,777), 
possibly because Professor Opderbeck based his calculation on more precise data.  
 206. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974). 
 207. Id. at 501. 
 208. This involves a choice not only between purchasing a brand drug and a generic drug, but also 
potentially choosing between several available and therapeutically equivalent products. See supra Part 
V.B. 
 209. In fact, many courts consider physicians to be the relevant “consumer” of prescription drugs. 
See Vaishnav, supra note 162, at 598 (“While at least one court has considered the role of patients as 
consumers, the more prevalent view seems to be that the patient’s preferences for prescription drugs 
are irrelevant to the demand for such drugs.”) (citing In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 
2d 618, 680 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (focusing on options available to 
the “consumer patient”); United States v. Ciba Geigy Corp., 508 F. Supp. 1118, 1126 (D.N.J. 1976) 
(noting that the marketing of drugs “is largely directed at the prescribing physician”); FTC v. 
Lundbeck, Inc., Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015, at *15–19, *21 (D. 
Minn. Aug. 31, 2010) (explaining that price changes may not affect a physician’s prescribing 
practices)). Despite the physician’s role in guiding the choice of the ultimate consumer, the antitrust 
laws protect the ultimate consumer, not the intervening physician, so the potential price effects on the 
ultimate consumer must be considered.  
 210. See, e.g., BlueCross BlueShield of Texas, Standard Preferred Drug List, BLUECROSS 
BLUESHIELD (Jan. 2014), http://www.bcbstx.com/pdf/rx_formulary_std_tx_2014.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/USJ7-UUPJ. See also Vaishnav, supra note 162, at 603–05, 608–10 (2011) (discussing 
the roles of third-party payers and pharmacy benefit managers).  
 211. See supra note 209. 
 212. Eric Palmer, Top 10 Pharma Advertising Budgets—2012, FIERCEPHARMA (Feb. 26, 2013), 
http://www.fiercepharma.com/special-reports/top-10-pharma-advertising-budgets-2012, archived at 
http://perma.cc/V9AF-GUQW.  
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accurately indicates future success, these budgets would be a highly 
inefficient use of resources. 
Reverse payment settlements must be presumptively valid and the 
burden should fall on the opponent of the settlement to show the 
likelihood of potential anticompetitive effects. Consumers would of course 
reap great benefits from a generic drug entering the market, but the 
presumed validity of the patent necessitates the presumptive legality of 
reverse payment settlements. 
E. Rebutting Presumptions and the Elimination of Potential Competition 
The presumptive legality of reverse payment settlements is, of course, 
nothing more than a presumption. Though this presumption is in conflict 
with the standard presumptive illegality of an increase in concentration in 
an already concentrated market,
213
 a plaintiff can still prove the 
anticompetitive effects of a settlement using merger analysis tools.
214
 By 
offering proof in the way it would in a less concentrated industry (or 
perhaps in a concentrated industry in which the merger results in a 
minimal increase in concentration),
215
 a plaintiff can overcome the 
presumption of a legal settlement.
216
 This is precisely the type of analysis 
the Supreme Court imposed on lower courts when it chose to “leave to the 
 
 
 213. See supra note 137. 
 214. The recommended presumptions of legality resulting from HHI statistics are simply useful 
tools that indicate whether a given merger is likely to produce anticompetitive concerns. Despite the 
fact that changes in the HHI may indicate that a merger is almost certainly anticompetitive, each 
merger must still be analyzed on its merits to determine the true potential for anticompetitive effects. 
This is explicitly stated in the Merger Guidelines:  
The purpose of these thresholds is not to provide a rigid screen to separate competitively 
benign mergers from anticompetitive ones, although high levels of concentration do raise 
concerns. Rather, they provide one way to identify some mergers unlikely to raise 
competitive concerns and some others for which it is particularly important to examine 
whether other competitive factors confirm, reinforce, or counteract the potentially harmful 
effects of increased concentration. 
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 97, § 5.3, 19 (emphasis added). 
 215. Such proof could include a showing of unilateral or coordinated effects insulated by high 
barriers to entry that prevent new firms from entering the market. High barriers to entry are near 
ubiquitous in pharmaceutical markets, see supra note 172, so the burden of rebutting the presumption 
is slightly reduced. 
 216. Placing this burden on the opponent of a settlement is entirely consistent with merger case 
law. The presumed validity of the patent can be considered evidence sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of illegality recommended by the Merger Guidelines, which shifts the burden of proof 
back to the plaintiff. Cf. United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“If 
the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional 
evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of 
persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.”) (citation omitted). 
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lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust 
litigation.”217 
The settlement opponent’s burden is not so great as to make proving a 
settlement is anticompetitive impossible. Instead, at least three specific 
characteristics of each settlement present opportunities to overcome the 
presumption of a valid settlement. These characteristics all require the type 
of fact-intensive inquiries that should be necessary for the plaintiff to meet 
its burden and overcome the presumption of legality.
218
 
First, in Actavis, the Court explained that the size of the settlement may 
indicate anticompetitive harm.
219
 The payment itself is a natural starting 
point. Does it appear to only cover the brand manufacturer’s anticipated 
litigation costs?
220
 Is it so large that it includes the generic challenger’s 
expected profits from entering the market?
221
 Is it so large that it 
substantially exceeds the generic challenger’s expected profits?222 While 
the size of the payment may not be dispositive, it may be an indicator of 
anticompetitive behavior.  
Second, the specific therapeutic effect of the drug can inform the 
analysis. If the brand drug is the only one available that produces a certain 
effect, the manufacturer may be willing to protect its product at all costs—
including by offending the antitrust laws.
223
 If, however, the brand drug is 
in a market with many therapeutic equivalents,
224
 the brand manufacturer 
may not have as great of an incentive to keep the generic out and is simply 
trying to avoid litigation. While part of this inquiry is resolved at the 
market definition stage, a full analysis will usually be required to 
 
 
 217. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013). 
 218. See supra note 216. 
 219. “[W]here a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee 
likely possesses the power to bring that harm about in practice. . . . [T]he size of the payment from a 
branded drug manufacturer to a prospective generic is itself a strong indicator of power.” Actavis, 133 
S. Ct. at 2236 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 220. Id. (“Where a reverse payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided 
litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the same concern that a patentee is using its 
monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent invalidation or a finding of noninfringement.”).  
 221. Brief for 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and the American Antitrust Institute 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 25, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416) (“Under the 
settlement, Solvay paid the generics between $29 million and $42 million per year to stay off the 
market, meaning that the payment at least approached the amount the generics would have made even 
if they were completely sure they could enter the market.”). 
 222. Id. at 24 (noting that even when applying “a very deferential scope-of-the-patent test,” the 
Second Circuit was concerned by a settlement in which the brand manufacturer paid the generic more 
than either party expected the generic would make by winning the suit and entering the market). 
 223. Protection through anticompetitive means assumes that the firm is not engaged in legal 
conduct pursuant to a valid patent. 
 224. For example, see supra note 170 for the market for Lyrica and its therapeutic equivalents. 
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accurately predict the brand manufacturer’s possible settlement 
motivations.
225
 This analysis will require a fact-intensive inquiry but may 
help a plaintiff overcome a presumptively legal settlement. 
Third, the pricing level of the branded drug relative to the 
manufacturer’s other products may reveal the manufacturer’s motivation 
to settle. This analysis can be performed in a variety of ways
226
 which may 
lead to a variety of conclusions about the anticompetitive effects of the 
settlement. Again, this requires a fact-intensive inquiry into the particular 
drug at issue.  
F. Systematic Analysis of Reverse Payment Settlements 
The procedures necessary for regulatory authorities to perform a 
systematic and fact-intensive review of reverse payment settlements are 
already, at least partially, in place. Just as merging parties are required to 
submit an HSR filing to the FTC and DOJ,
227
 parties entering into a 
reverse payment settlement are required to submit a similar filing to the 
agencies.
228
 Just as with ordinary merger review, this serves an excellent 
starting point for a fact-intensive investigation of whether the agencies can 
rebut the presumption of a legal reverse payment settlement. As the 
regulating agencies are well versed in assessing the competitive effects of 
 
 
 225. Consider again the Lyrica market described in note 170, supra. Despite facing competition 
from thirteen other drugs, Lyrica does not face competition from a bioequivalent generic and has 
retained a 75% market share. Combined with the trend of brand manufacturers continuing to charge 
pre-entry rates after generic entry and conceding market share and thus lowering profits, see supra 
note 179, the brand manufacturer may well attempt to block generic entry even in these “broader” 
markets. In fact, the FDA approved three applications for a generic form of Lyrica in 2012. FDA, 
Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION (July 28, 2014), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/Cder/ob/docs/tempai. 
cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/PV9R-5WWR; Generic Lyrica Availability, DRUGS.COM, http://www. 
drugs.com/availability/generic-lyrica.html (last visited July 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/ 
BA88-V9CJ. Pfizer chose to litigate the validity of its patent and the United States District Court for 
the District of Delaware upheld the validity of Pfizer’s Lyrica patent, blocking generic entry into the 
market. Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharm. U.S.A., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 643, 731 (D. Del. 2012). 
 226. For example, if the manufacturer charges more for the particular drug involved in the 
settlement than for other drugs that it produces, this may suggest an above-normal profit margin for the 
drug which would provide an incentive to keep the generic out of the market as illegal maintenance of 
monopoly power. Cf. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be 
deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”). Contrarily, if a time sequence analysis shows a declining brand drug 
price, the brand manufacturer may simply want to avoid the cost of litigation (and potential, however 
slight, exposure as the holder of weak or invalid patents). This would be an ordinary settlement and 
would not raise anticompetitive concerns.  
 227. See supra Part III.B. 
 228. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
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mergers,
229
 they can efficiently apply merger analyses to the reported 
reverse payment settlements and filter out those that pose potential 
anticompetitive threats. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The common anticompetitive concerns of reverse payment settlements 
and mergers allow the imputation of merger analysis to settlement 
analysis. This is particularly helpful because the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Actavis undercut many of the prior reverse payment settlement 
analyses.
230
 By appropriating analytical tools and case law from an 
analogous area of law, lower courts can immediately begin evaluating 
cases with a method that is consistent across jurisdictions. This immediate 
consistency is necessary to avoid relapsing into the circuit split that has 
plagued the history of reverse payment settlement cases. 
Though reverse payment settlements exhibit the natural tension 
between antitrust law and patent law, the presumptive validity of a patent 
requires that a given settlement be presumed valid. The Supreme Court 
recognized as much by rejecting the FTC’s request to apply a “quick look” 
analysis in Actavis and instead requiring a full rule of reason analysis.
231
 
Applying merger analysis techniques allows for the assumption of validity 
as a starting point, and then applies a consistent and fact-intensive inquiry 
to the settlements. Such a structure ensures that the presumption of legality 
is rebutted only when the settlement is truly anticompetitive. This 
framework balances the ultimate needs of consumers: it allows for the 
lawful maintenance of a patent that is necessary for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers to invest in and develop new drugs, but prevents customers 
from being hurt by the prevention of lawful generic competition. 
Michael Toomey

 
 
 
 229. FTC, Mergers, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/mergers (last visited Feb. 8, 2013) (“Each year, the FTC and Department of Justice review over a 
thousand merger filings.”), archived at http://perma.cc/584X-4TL4. 
 230. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013). 
 231. Id. at 2237. 
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